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INTRODUCTION1
The “CISG” is a shorthand expression for the 1980 United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.2
Also sometimes referred to as the “Vienna Convention”, the CISG is
the first uniform sales law to win acceptance on a worldwide scale:3
more than sixty States have ratified the Convention, representing
more than two-thirds of all world trade.4
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juris University of Copenhagen. Professor of Law University of Copenhagen.
1. With the permission of Kluwer Law International, this article includes certain material
adapted from HERBERT BERNSTEIN AND JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN
EUROPE (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY]. As the author of this article, I
would add that Herbert Bernstein was not only co-author of UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN
EUROPE (1st ed. 1997); he also provided me with inspiration and constructive criticism as I
wrote UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA (1995) and the first (1996) edition of Under-
standing the CISG in Scandinavia (2d ed. 2002). During the spring of 2001 I spent five weeks
with Herbert at the Duke University Law School, co-teaching Comparative Contracts and pre-
paring the second edition of our book. At the very end of that happy and productive period, my
dear friend and trusted colleague suddenly passed away. Left alone to complete our project, and
given my other responsibilities at the University of Copenhagen, it took me a full year to tie
countless loose ends and then re-write our 1997 text. As more fully acknowledged in the Preface
to the Second Edition of our book, I was fortunate to secure valuable advice and help from Pro-
fessor Harry Flechtner (University of Pittsburgh), Executive Secretary Albert Kritzer (Pace
University) and Lecturer Morten Fogt (EuroFaculty, University of Vilnius). To the extent this
article contains material these CISG-experts reviewed previously, I thank them once again.
2. Some say the four letters individually; some say the acronym as one word (with a “soft”
C). No uniform usage has as yet developed with respect to an acronym designating the Conven-
tion; see PILTZ, B., INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT (Munich 1993), § 1 Rd.Nr. 17;
SCHLECHTRIEM, P., INTERNATIONALES UN-KAUFRECHT (Tübingen 1996) at V note 3.
3. Regarding the ULIS and ULF Conventions, which preceded the CISG, see BERSTEIN
& LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 1-2.
4. As of 1 May 2002, 61 States had adopted the CISG. See http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/
countries/cntries.html. Please note: this www-address—and all other web-sites cited in this arti-
cle—were successfully visited on March 3, 2003.
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Illustration 1: Merchant-buyer B in New York faxes an order for 10
dozen designer dresses to seller-manufacturer S in France, and S
accepts the order by faxing a brief confirmation to B. Later, a dis-
pute develops concerning the quality of the goods.
Simply because the parties to this sale of goods (dresses) have
their places of business in different CISG Contracting States,5 an
American or French court or an arbitral tribunal asked to resolve the
dispute in question will do so—not on the basis of UCC Article 2 or
French domestic sales law, but —on the basis of the CISG.6
In a case like Illustration 1 the application of the Convention
(and, conversely, the non-application of domestic sales law) is a very
straightforward affair. In other cases, we may need to ask and answer
questions like these:
1.  Does the CISG apply by default,7 or have the parties exercised
their right to opt out of the Convention regime (Article 6)?
2.  Does an international transaction involving the supply of com-
puter software  qualify as a CISG sale of goods (Articles 1, 2 and 3)?
3. Is the particular matter (issue) in question governed by the CISG
(Articles 4-5)? And if the  matter is governed—or perhaps “gov-
erned-but-not-settled” under Article 7(2)—does the Convention
then preëmpt the application of domestic rules of law?
According to some Convention commentators, doubts regarding
CISG application are often best resolved favor conventionis, i.e., in
favor of the Convention and its application (and at the expense of
domestic law). The main rationale for such a pro-CISG bias is that
the Convention—now accepted by the world community as a suitable
default regime for international sales8—should be applied wherever
sufficient reasons for its application exist, and where its language does
not preclude such application.9
5. The first/main rule in CISG Article 1 provides: “(1) This Convention applies to con-
tracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States: (a) when
the States are Contracting States . . .” United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 60 [hereinafter CISG].
6. First, courts and arbitrators will apply Part II of the Convention as regards the contract
formation process, deciding whether or not the parties have reached an agreement. If, on this
basis, a contract for the sale of goods has in fact been made, the CISG Part III will then be used
to fill in contractual gaps as regards the obligations of the parties, their rights and remedies for
breach, etc.
7. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
9. See WITZ, C., LES PREMIÈRES APPLICATIONS JURISPRUDENTIELLES DU DROIT
UNIFORME DE LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE (Paris 1995) no. 30 for a discussion of what Witz
calls the favor conventionis of the German courts.
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Of course, not all issues which relate to the Convention’s Sphere
of Application (CISG Part I) are amenable to resolution by the use of
legal maxims, mechanical allocation of proof-burdens or other simple
means. Indeed, according to the Understanding I shared and devel-
oped with Herbert Bernstein,10 at least some doubts regarding Con-
vention application are best resolved “the other way”, i.e., by—or in
conjunction with—the application of domestic rules of law.
So, while it might sound catchy and convenient, the phrase in
dubio pro conventione (which Herbert himself coined)11 does not rep-
resent a principle to be applied blindly, to answer all controversial
questions arising under CISG Part I.
I. INTERNATIONAL INTERPRETATION
UNDER ARTICLE 7(1)
The various in dubio (sub)issues to be discussed here all involve
questions of treaty  interpretation, and CISG Article 7(1) is a General
Provision which tells us how to interpret the whole Convention, in-
cluding the rules which delimit its Sphere of Application:
“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in
its application . . .”
This CISG rule amounts to a (public international law) command
to all Contracting States and their courts:12 each such State shall have
regard to the international character of the treaty and the need to
promote uniformity in its application. Conversely, Contracting States
ought not allow domestic conceptions to subvert a uniform applica-
tion of CISG rules.13 And yet, we have already seen some courts slip
10. See supra note 1.
11. With inspiration from Witz (supra note 9) for use in BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra
note 1, § 2-3 with note 14.
12. The rule in Article 7(1) also contains another important passage which requires that the
CISG needs to interpreted so as to promote the observance of good faith in international trade.
So far, it would seem that the main impact of this part of the rule concerns—not (as one might
have expected) interpretation of the treaty text, but rather—the emergence of a  duty which im-
pliedly obligates the parties to every CISG contract to act in good faith. See generally BERNSTEIN
& LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 2-10.
13. For instance, interpretation of the concept of “impediments” in Article 79 ought not be
guided by (sometimes too narrow) notions of Anglo-American law; accord Stoll in
SCHLECHTRIEM, P., KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT - CISG (3d ed. Mu-
nich 2000) Art. 79, Rd.Nr. 12, 17 with note 55 [hereinafter SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR] and
in SCHLECHTRIEM, P., COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS (CISG) (Geoffrey Thomas trans., Clarendon Press 1998) [hereinafter
SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY]; see also Witz, supra note 9, no. 86 with note 126. Instead, a
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into a parochial kind of CISG interpretation, inter alia, when the rele-
vant Convention terminology seems reminiscent of older local (do-
mestic) law.14 Worse yet, national courts sometimes simply overlook
the new legislative message altogether, failing to recognize the fact
that the previously applicable domestic authority (statute or case law)
has been replaced by a different, international CISG rule.15
To discern the meaning of a given CISG rule, the text of that
provision is the obvious place to start.16 In many instances, however,
no single plain meaning can be gleaned from the “letter of the law”
(the six official and equally authentic versions of the treaty).17 For this
reason, courts and commentators regularly consult secondary sources
of law.18 Since the Convention was created by an international legisla-
tor, courts and commentators sometimes turn to the voluminous
CISG legislative history (travaux préparatoires),19 looking for evi-
dence of legislative intent.20 In many cases, however, this history
notion autonome should be applied: see Audit, B., LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE
MARCHANDISES (Paris 1990) no. 180. Re. Article 79 see also generally BERNSTEIN &
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, §§ 6-19 and 6-32.
14. For example, the “foreseeability” rule in CISG Article 74 is clearly reminiscent of do-
mestic analogues: see generally BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 6-15.
15. Witz, supra note 9, no. 62 and Magnus in VON STAUDINGER, J., KOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN: WIENER
UN-KAUFRECHT (CISG) (Neubearbeitund 1999 von Magnus, Berlin 2000) Art. 39, Rd.Nr. 36-
41 [hereinafter MAGNUS] who both fault the German judges for their seeming failure to recog-
nize that the CISG Article 39 rule is not the same as that under the ULIS (supra § note 3). An-
other example is the Beijing Metals case (BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 4-5 with
notes 58, 64) which ignores the effect of Article 8 in relation to parol evidence. And then there
are the not-so-few cases where neither the court nor the parties lawyers knew that the CISG ap-
plied: see, e.g. re. GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 894 P.2d 470 (Or.Ct. App.
1995), rev. granted, 898 P.2d 770 (or. 1995) aff’d, 914 P.2d 682 (Or. 1996); see also Harry M.
Flechtner, Another CISG Case in the U.S. Courts: Pitfalls for the Practitioner and the Potential
for Regionalized Interpretations, 15 J.L. & COMM. 127 (1995), available at
http://www.cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cisg/biblio/jlvcvol15.html.
16. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Article 31 (“ordinary
meaning”). Accord: Herber in SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, Art. 7, Rd.Nr.
20.
17. Inevitably, these official texts differ on a (limited) number of substantive points; even
greater variations have been occasioned by the numerous unofficial translations now in use
(e.g.) in Germany and the Scandinavian States (Denmark, Finland, Norway & Sweden).
18. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, Article 32 (permitting
recourse to “supplementary means”).
19. For examples of decisions which cite the Convention travaux, see the decision (involv-
ing the quality of New Zealand mussels) by OLG Frankfurt (Germany), 20 April 1994, RIW
1994, 593 and BGH, 8 March 1995, RIW 1995, 595, both decisions available at
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=13353&x=1; for more details see
BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 4-8.
20. Professor Honnold has performed a helpful task by organizing the most relevant
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(which some date back to include the unsuccessful 1964 ULIS
treaty)21 proves  ambiguous and inconclusive.22 The Secretariat Com-
mentary to the 1978 Draft Convention23 is a helpful tool in some in-
stances, but it is not the official authority (anywhere) as to what the
1980 Vienna Convention means.24 Nor should we expect the mixed
motives underlying the votes of Convention delegates to provide de-
finitive solutions to complex questions which arise decades later as to
the proper interpretation and application of the CISG rules.25
This brings us to a different secondary source—the CISG case
law—though there are, to be sure, also difficulties here. When called
upon to interpret a domestic statute, national courts consider them-
selves bound—or at least influenced—by local  precedent, i.e., rele-
documents in a single-volume: see JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES (1989).
21. Many commentators trace the CISG “history” back to the first Uniform Sales Law,
ULIS, but since that treaty was found unacceptable by many States which later became CISG
States, the application of ULIS concepts, interpretations and precedents will not always advance
an autonomous interpretation of the CISG. For examples of the use of ULIS as a CISG tool see
BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 2-5 with note 49, § 2-6 with note 78 and § 2-9 with
note 122.
22. Compare, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Hague Service
Convention in Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988), where the majority and
minority opinions of the Court each found excerpts from the same legislative history in support
of their own results. See also Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales
Law,  24 GA. J. INT. & COMP. L. 183 (1994)  at 206-08, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cisg/biblio/franco.html.
23. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1979), reprinted in HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 404.
24. An American proposal to draft an official Commentary to the 1980 Convention was
rejected: see Peter Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention, in INTERNATIONAL SALES
(Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984) at 1-15 with note 29. A subsequent proposal set forth
by James Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the International  Sale
of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 273, 300 (1999), that the US
adopt the UN Secretariat’s unofficial Draft Commentary as the “official” American CISG com-
mentary seems highly ill-advised.
25. Consider, for example, the “legislative history” surrounding the controversial and diffi-
cult-to-understand “gap-filling” formula in paragraph (2) of Article 7 (discussed infra, text ac-
companying note 94 et seq)—a subject not dealt with in the 1978 New York Draft: After a pro-
posal by the Bulgarian representative to the 1980 Diplomatic Conference (that the seller’s law
should always govern questions for which the Convention provided no solution) found no sup-
port, the complex GDR proposal (combining suggestions made by the CSSR and Italy) which
ultimately became Article 7(2) was adopted by a vote of 17:14 with 11 abstentions, perhaps indi-
cating that a majority of the delegates present in Vienna felt the Convention would be better
without any gap-filling rule. Compare Herber in  SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra 13,
Art. 7, Rd.Nr. 1-4 and sources cited there. Even as regards the use of his own DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (supra note 20) as an interpretative aid, Professor Honnold urges restraint: “Interpre-
tation based on discussions by a large legislative body is more meaningful for decisions of broad
issues of policy than for detailed applications.” JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 463 (3rd ed. 1999).
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vant decisions previously rendered by the courts of that particular
State. When it comes to decisions rendered pursuant to the Conven-
tion, however, the stare decisis issues are more complex. For one
thing, courts in Contracting States cannot rely solely on local CISG
precedent (i.e., even in a situation where such authority exists): re-
gard must also be had to the international view.26 This presents a for-
midable challenge,27 but we now have reasonably comprehensive elec-
tronic access to a broad range of reported decisions.28
A related barrier which still stands in the way of uniform inter-
pretation is the fact that CISG decisions rendered by the highest na-
tional courts cannot be appealed;29 no international court sits atop the
CISG “pyramid” with the authority to iron out differences in opinion
among the national instances below.30 Nor has any system or scale
been established which courts or arbitrators might use to evaluate the
26. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
27. Especially considering the number of Contracting States: see supra note 4. As of this
writing (early 2003) more than 1,000 CISG decisions have been reported: see (e.g.)
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/caseschedule.html.
28. Having acknowledged the “information problem” early on, UNCITRAL took an im-
portant first step in 1993, establishing the CLOUT system for the collection and dissemination
of court decisions and arbitral awards relating to the CISG (and other UNCITRAL texts). Un-
der this system, national correspondents collect and prepare abstracts of available court deci-
sions and arbitral awards which are then published by the UNCITRAL Secretariat in English
and the other official U.N. languages. The decisions and awards themselves are also made avail-
able (in the language of origin) by the Secretariat. See http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.
The CLOUT system, though important, does not provide all the information we need. Not all
CISG decisions reported in CLOUT (based on the abstracts prepared by national reporters and
then edited by UNCITRAL) provide readers with adequate information. For one thing, the
length and quality of the CLOUT abstracts varies considerably from case to case. See also
MAGNUS, supra note 15, Art. 6, Rd.Nr. 64 (and authors cited there) and Audit, VENTE
INTERNATIONALE, supra note 13, no. 44. Fortunately, CLOUT is not our only case-law source.
See, e.g., the CISGW3 website: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu. Developed and maintained by the
Pace Institute of International Commercial Law in New York, CISGW3 makes a wealth of
CISG information, including English translations of many foreign-language cases, easily avail-
able. The UNILEX data base, developed and maintained by the Centre for Comparative and
Foreign Law Studies in Rome, is another very convenient and useful source of CISG informa-
tion which includes case-abstracts, cross referes and original language texts: see
http://www.unilex.info/. Regarding the forthcoming (UNCITRAL) CISG Case Digets see infra
note 36 with accompanying text.
29. CISG decisions rendered by arbitral tribunals (in the form of awards) cannot be ap-
pealed either. Depending on the lex arbitri of the jurisdiction concerned, however, they some-
times can be “set aside” (invalidated). See generally JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY & KETILBJØRN
HERTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION & COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. forthcoming
Fall 2003) Ch. 6.
30. Contrast the authority granted to the European Court to answer questions submitted
by the courts of EU Member States re. the proper interpretation of the 1968 Brussels Conven-
tion (as of 2002 the Brussels Regulation) on Jurisdiction and Judgments. See generally
LOOKOFSKY & HERTZ, id., ch. 2.2.
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weight of foreign CISG precedents.31 So, while we find many exam-
ples of harmonious Convention interpretation,32 the CISG musicians
do not all play the same tune;33 indeed, domestic idiosyncracies some-
times make it difficult for outsiders to a given national system to even
“hear” the message sounded by foreign precedent.34 For these and
other reasons, the courts in the various Contracting States resemble
“members of an orchestra without a conductor.”35 Case-
commentators may help clarify the situation, but they have no baton
to make judges and arbitrators march in step.36
This is not to suggest that problems of Convention interpretation
are insurmountable or that those international merchants who put a
premium on “certainty” should avoid the CISG regime,37 but it should
31. For a full discussion of this problem—and a proposed method for determining the
precedential authority of foreign decisions—see Harry M. Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys Fees
as Damages under the U.N. Sales Convention: A Case Study on the New International Commer-
cial Practice and the Role of Foreign Case Law in CISG Jurisprudence, with a Post-Script on
Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 22 NW J. BUS. L. & POLICY (forth-
coming 2002), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/flechtner4.html.
32. For an example of uniform interpretation see infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text
(nearly all courts and arbitrators have required clear evidence of the parties’ mutual intent to
“contract out” of Convention applicability under Article 1).
33. Regarding the varied interpretations of the notice provisions in Articles 38-39 see
BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 4-9.
34. See, e.g., Flechtner, supra note 31, regarding the difficulties faced by an American court
seeking foreign precedent on the question of whether the “full compensation” principle ex-
pressed in Article 74 requires courts in a Contracting States to award attorneys’ fees to the pre-
vailing party (or whether American courts ought still follow the “American” rule). See also the
case-note by Lookofsky in 6 VINDOBONA J. OF INT. L. AND ARBITRATION 27 (2002), available
at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky5.html. The same question is discussed fur-
ther by Flectner and Lookofsky, Viva Zapata! American Procedure and CISG Substance in a
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal, 7 VINDOBONA J. OF INT. L. AND ARBITRATION (Spring 2003).
35. Schlechtriem, P., Uniform Sales Law in the Decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem3.html at 2.
36. Compare Herber in SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, Art. 7, Rd.Nr. 14,
characterizing as “dangerous” the proposal (Report on UNCITRAL work on its 21st session,
11-22 April 1988, ch X sec. 98 et seq.) to form an Editorial Board to monitor and clarify pub-
lished CISG decisions. Whether the forthcoming “Case Digests” (expected to be published by
UNCITRAL in 2003) will confirm or allay such fears remains to be seen, but there is surely
some danger that knowledgeable Digest commentators might be tempted to put a scholarly
“spin” on the precedents they report. See Joseph Lookofsky, CISG Foreign Case Law: How
Much Regard Should We Have? A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Draft Digest of CISG Part
I, in THE UNCITRAL CASE DIGEST AND BEYOND (Ronald Brand, Franco Ferrari and Harry
Flechtner eds., forthcoming 2003). For an oral intervention on the same topic, made at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh School of Law Conference Beyond the UNCITRAL Digest (February 7,
2003), see (the last 10 minutes of) Session One of http://www.law.pitt.edu/programs/
international/UncitralDigestVideo.htm.
37. Unfortunately, some of the problems suggested here apparently encourage some con-
tracting parties (with the requisite bargaining power) to “opt out” of the Convention regime
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serve to remind us that the law of international commerce is still at a
relatively early stage of development and that the interpretation and
application of international statutory law is an even less exact science
than the discipline which we lawyers practice at the  domestic level.38
Having set forth these very general caveats, I shall now proceed
to consider some specific issues regarding the interpretation and de-
limitation of the Convention’s field of application, in each instance
asking whether (or not) the in dubio pro conventione maxim should
apply.
II. OPT-OUTS UNDER ARTICLE 6
The main rule regarding CISG application is Article 1(1)(a):39 the
Convention applies automatically to sales of goods contracts between
parties whose places of business are in different Contracting States.40
In most CISG jurisdictions this rule is supplemented by Article
1(1)(b),41 so the Convention also applies “when the rules of private
international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting
State.”42
Illustration 2: Merchant-buyer B in London faxes an order for 10
dozen designer dresses to seller-manufacturer S in France, and S
accepts the order by faxing a brief confirmation to B. Later, a dis-
pute develops concerning the quality of the goods.
In this situation, a French court would apply the CISG, even though
the United Kingdom is not (as of 2002) a CISG Contracting State.43
The results reached in Illustrations 1 and 2—the application of
the CISG “by default”—assume that the parties concerned have not
otherwise agreed. Article 6 provides direct authority for contracting
out of the CISG,44 and this includes not only the authority to derogate
(and into their own domestic sales law); see, e.g., Flechtner, supra note 31.
38. Accord Joseph Lookofsky, Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales: Problems in
the Harmonization of Private Law Rules, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 403 (1991).
39. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
40. Assuming the contract is made after the CISG has become effective in the Contracting
States where the parties reside: see CISG Article 100.
41. Regarding the Article 95 declaration (reservation), made by the U.S., China and a few
other States in respect of Article 1(1)(b) see BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 2-4.
42. Provided the two parties to the transaction have their places of business in different
States (countries): see CISG Article 1(1) and the narrow exception in Article 1(2).
43. In all likelihood, an English court would too. For a more detailed discussion of CISG
application in this situation, see BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 2-4.
44. CISG Article 6 provides: The parties may exclude the application of this Convention
or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.
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in part,45 but also the power to exclude Convention application en-
tirely.
Illustration 3: S in France sells heavy machinery to B in Russia. The
contract includes a term providing that the sale “shall be governed
by the Swedish Sale of Goods Act of 1990 (Köplagen)”.
In this case, the intent of the parties (and the understanding of rea-
sonable persons in general) seems clear:46  Swedish domestic sales law
should displace the CISG regime, i.e., even though both French and
Russian courts otherwise (absent the choice-of-law clause) automati-
cally would have applied the Convention.47
Illustration 4: S in Denmark sells heavy machinery to B in Russia.
The contract includes a standard term providing that the sale “shall
be governed by the law of the Vendor’s country”.48
The choice of law clause in this Illustration is very different, simply
because the 1980 Vienna Convention and the Danish (domestic)
Sales Act (Købeloven of 1906) are both part of “the law of the Ven-
dor’s country.” Since the clause is arguably amenable to differing in-
terpretations, we might expect S (the Danish Vendor) to prefer the
application of the Danish Sales Act, whereas B (and B’s lawyers)
would have good reason to prefer the CISG.49
45. See preceding note. If, for example, the seller’s standard terms and conditions become
part of that sales contract, they will almost surely provide a special set of remedies for breach; if
so, this part of the parties’ agreement will displace the CISG remedial rules.
46. Because the CISG applies by default, unless and until it is determined that the parties
have contracted out, the choice-of-law clause should be interpreted in accordance with Article 8
which provides as follows:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a
party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could
not have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other conduct
of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable per-
son of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person
would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the
case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established be-
tween themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.
Regarding contract interpretation under Article 8 see generally MAGNUS, supra note 15, Art.8
Rd.Nr.7 and authors cited there; see also Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 United Nations Conven-
tion on the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS,
CONTRACTS, ¶ 81-86 (J. Herbots ed., Supp. 29 2000).
47. Both courts would have otherwise applied the Convention because the parties reside in
different Contracting States. See supra note 5.
48. The latest version of the Nordic General Conditions (NL 01: in English  at http://www.
vi.se/files/uploadfiles/nl01eb.pdf) contains an applicable law clause like this.
49. For example, B may prefer the CISG because Russians (and others outside Scandina-
via) have no easy access to Danish domestic law. There is no official translation of Danish sales
legislation, just as nearly all material relating to it is in Danish. See, e.g., LOOKOFSKY, KØB.
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Even if we assume that S (who probably supplied the standard
term in question) intended that Danish domestic sales law apply, that
subjective interpretation should not be decisive, unless it was actually
shared by B at the time of contracting or unless a reasonable person
in B’s shoes would so have understood the term.50 In this case, we
would not expect that B “knew or could not have been unaware what
[S’s] intent was,”51 nor would we expect a reasonable person standing
in B’s shoes to have read the clause as  “narrowly” as S—i.e., so as to
exclude the Convention, notwithstanding the hard fact that the CISG
is an integral part of “the law of the Vendor’s country”52— especially
since Article 6 represents an exception to the rule which makes the
Convention applicable to international sales by default.
For these reasons, we would expect a court or tribunal to inter-
pret “the law of the Vendor’s country” to include the CISG (at the
expense of domestic sales law),53 and the Convention case law clearly
confirms that result. Indeed, a very large number of precedents show
that an express contractual choice of (e.g.) “Austrian law,”54 or “the
laws of Switzerland”55 or “the law of the seller’s country”56 should be
DANSK INDENLANDSK KØBSRET (2d ed. Copenhagen 2002).
50. Regarding CISG Article 8 see note 46 supra. Similar results follow if the rule in Article
8(2) is supplemented by the contra proferentem principle; see text infra with note 105 and
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Art. 4.6, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13636&x=1. Re. contra proferentem
and the interpetation of “agreed documents” see Junge in SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, su-
pra note 13, pp. 72-73 and in Schlechtriem, KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, p. 144. See also
Lookofsky, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION, supra note 46, ¶ 79.
51. See CISG Article 8(1).
52. As previously indicated, it would be difficult for a Russian buyer to even gain access to
the statute in a non-Danish text, let alone understand the implications of its rules.
53. As a supplement to the CISG, domestic law rules may come into play. For example,
since rules of contractual validity remain generally outside the CISG scope, the validity of (e.g.)
a liability disclaimer in the Vendor’s standard terms would have to be determined by domestic
law rules—in this case Danish law.
54. See ICC Case 7660/JK of 23 August 1994, available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.
cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=13355&x=1. A more direct approach would be to simply interpret the
parties’ choice of “Austrian law” as comprising the CISG (the Austrian law applicable to inter-
national sales). See also ICC Case 6653/1993, JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1993),
1040, also available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=13355&x=1 (ref-
erence to “French law” in a sales contract between a Turkish seller and a Syrian buyer means
the CISG ); see also Witz, PREMIÈRES APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, no. 28.
55. See ICC CASE 7565/1994, available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2376
&dsmid=13355&x=1. See also Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, decision of 30 August 2000, avail-
able at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=13353 (invoice stated “all trans-
actions and sales are subject to Swiss law”; to exclude application of CISG plaintiff would have
had to refer to the relevant provisions of Swiss domestic law).
56. Provided that “country” is a Contracting State. See, e.g., International Court of Com-
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interpreted— not as a reference to domestic sales law, but rather—as
the parties’ reaffirmation of the (CISG) rule-set which, absent the
clause, would apply by default.57So, when dealing with the question of
opt-outs, we let the in dubio pro conventione maxim apply. The many
CISG Contracting States have accepted the Convention as a well-
balanced regime, fair to both parties and suitable for the regulation of
international sales of goods,58 and the Convention applies by default,
unless the contract unmistakably precludes that result.59
III. COMPUTER SOFTWARE AS “GOODS”
UNDER CISG ARTICLES 1, 2 AND 3
The determination that the Convention applies by virtue of Arti-
cle 1 presupposes—not only that the parties have not opted out, but
also—that the transaction in question can be classified as a (CISG)
“sale of goods”. Does the supply of a computer program qualify as
such? If courts or arbitrators are in doubt as to Convention applica-
bility, should the in dubio maxim apply?
mercial Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce & Industry of the Russian Federation, decision of
24 January 2000, reported and translated at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/
000124r1.html).
57. Accord: Franco Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application
and Scholarly Writing, 15 J. LAW & COMMERCE 1 (1995), text with note 627; Schlechtriem,
Bundesgerichtshof, supra note 35, at 2, text with note 13.  Nearly all reported CISG decisions
support this view. See, e.g., the decision of LG Düsseldorf (Germany), 11 October 1995 (No. 2 O
506/94), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/951011g1.html, applying the
CISG on the basis of Art. 1(1)(a), though seller’s standard terms provided for application of
“German law”: the express choice of German law could not in itself amount to an implied exclu-
sion of CISG, because the CISG is part of the law of that State. Accord: Asante Technologies,
Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F.Supp.2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001). See also OLG Koblenz (Ger-
many), 17 September 1993 (no. 2 U 1230/91), RIW 1993, 934-938, CLOUT Case 281, where the
parties’ choice of “French law”, coupled with the 1(1)(b) rule, led to the CISG.
In situations like these, where the starting point is that the CISG applies by virtue of
Article 1(1)(a)-(b), the interpretation of “statements” (clauses) like “German law” or “French
law” should be governed by Article 8 (discussed in BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, §
2-12), so the intention of the party who “made” the statement (drafted the clause) will not lead
to domestic law, unless that interpretation was shared by the other party or a reasonable person
in his or her shoes would so understand the statement. Similar results follow if the rule in CISG
Article 8(2) is supplemented by the contra proferentem principle; see UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES,
supra note 50, Art. 4.6. Re. contra proferentem and the interpetation of agreed documents
(drafted by representatives of both buyer and seller), see Junge in SCHLECHTRIEM,
COMMENTARY, supra note 13, pp. 72-73 and in Schlechtriem, KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, p.
144.
58. See also supra notes 8 and 9, and accompanying text.
59. See Witz, PREMIÈRES APPLICATIONS, supra note 9, no. 30, for a discussion of what
Witz calls the favor conventionis of the German courts.
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Illustration 5: Merchant S in Germany supplies a computer program
to Merchant B in France. The program, designed to facilitate the
billing of customers, is properly installed in B’s computer system,
but the software performs badly (it “shuts down” repeatedly and
unpredictably), arguably doing B’s business more harm than good.
To determine whether the CISG applies to the transaction described
in this Illustration (by default),60 we might start with the Convention
text,61 but the CISG provides no positive definitions of “sale” or
“goods.” To be sure, CISG Articles 2 and 3 expressly exclude certain
transactions which might otherwise qualify as sales of goods. How-
ever, transactions in computer software are not specifically excluded,
and the exclusion of certain “intangibles” (like electricity, shares of
stock and securities)62 does not lead to the conclusion that the subject
matter of a CISG sale must always be a tangible thing,63 nor does the
refusal by a German court to characterize a “scholarly market analy-
sis” as CISG goods lend logical support to such a (broad) generaliza-
tion;64 indeed, a market analysis and a computer program are very dif-
ferent things.65
60. For present purposes, we assume that the parties to this particular transaction have not
agreed to exclude the entire Convention regime. It might, of course, be important to know
whether S, in connection with the marketing and/or sale of this product, proffered a set of
(shrink-wrapped/click-wrapped, fine-print) terms. Regarding the complex questions which
sometimes surround the incorporation, interpretation and validity of standard terms see  gener-
ally BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, ch. 7. Regarding the inappropriate “license” no-
menclature which software suppliers sometimes employ in their standard terms see infra notes
76 and 81 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
62. CISG Articles 2(d) and 2(f).
63. Note that, while the sale of electricity is excluded from application of the CISG, the
sale of gas is not (see Audit, supra note 13, no. 34), and commentators rightly reject analogous
application of the rule to gas: see MAGNUS, supra note 15, Art. 2, Rd.Nr. 50.
64. See the decision of OLG Köln, 26 August 1994, RIW 1994, 970, CLOUT Case 122,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/940826g1.html, holding that a con-
tract calling for a “scholarly analysis of a certain segment of the German market for express de-
livery services” did not constitute a contract for the “sale of goods”. In this connection, the court
noted that a sale of goods is characterized by the transfer of property in an “object”; though the
analysis results were embodied in a written report, the main concern of the parties was the right
to use the ideas therein. See also WITZ, supra note 9, at 32-33. As with the software issue, the
question of whether know-how is CISG goods should not depend on its “incorporation in a
physical medium”; accord MAGNUS, supra note 15, Art. 1, Rd.Nr. 46; but see Ferrari in
SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR, supra note 13,Art. 1, Rd.Nr. 38; compare Herber in
SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, Art. 1,  Rd.Nr. 21a.
65. See OLG Koblenz (Germany), supra note 57. Accord: Herber in SCHLECHTRIEM,
COMMENTARY, supra note 13, Art.1 Rd.Nr. 21 with n. 37a. But see contrary obiter dictum in the
German non-software case cited in the preceding note. Compare Ferrari, supra note 57, who (id.
with note 430) combines that dictum with ULIS terminology to support the proposition that only
“corporeal moveable goods” (objets mobiliers corporels) qualify as CISG goods.
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As a starting point, even a contract for the supply of goods “to be
manufactured or produced” is a CISG sale under Article 3(1), and
this is true even if the value of the labor and services involved exceeds
the value of the raw materials needed to manufacture the goods con-
cerned. If a fancy restaurant (B) in Italy buys high-priced dishes from
Royal Copenhagen (S) in Denmark, that transaction qualifies as a
CISG sale-of-goods; the fact that the design on the dishes is pains-
takingly hand-painted by Danish craftswomen (at great expense to
the manufacturer) does not turn the S-B transaction into a contract
(mainly) for the provision of “services” under Article 3(2). By the
same token, if S in Germany manufactures and delivers intangible
software to B in France, the fact that the value of that product is
mainly attributable to the intellectual efforts of brainy (and pricy) IT-
nerds hired by S to produce it does not somehow render the S-B
transaction “ineligible” as a CISG sale of goods.66
The treaty demands an autonomous (international) interpreta-
tion,67 but when the text of the treaty leaves us in doubt, we need not
blind ourselves to the “common core” of commercial wisdom re-
66. An arbitral award rendered in Stockholm, Sweden in 2003 involved a French supplier
(of computers and computer-related systems and services) and a Russian recipient, i.e., parties
in different CISG Contracting States. Although the contract was to be “governed, construed
and interpreted in accordance with the Law of Russian Federation” (compare Illustration 4 su-
pra), the parties disagreed as to whether the CISG should apply. The recipient argued, inter alia,
that the Convention should apply by virtue of the “preponderant part” rule in Article 3(2), since
the contract itself designated items amounting to 55% of the total contract price as “Goods”
(including standard software designated “goods”, but excluding custom software designated
“services”). Noting that the (official) Russian language version of the CISG (which does not
duplicate the English version on this point) places emphasis on whether the services to be pro-
vided constitute the “fundamental” (osnovnoe) contract part, the supplier argued, inter alia, that
the contract fundamentally concerned the provision of services, that the software was provided
in the form of licenses, and that (in any event) customized software ought not be considered as
CISG goods. Although the Sole Arbitrator noted that the application or non-application of the
CISG presented a “potential threshold issue”, he also noted that “the Contract and its provi-
sions take precedence both over the CISG and Russian law.” And since he found that the Con-
tract itself “provided solutions and answers” to the issues presented (regarding the alleged
breach, claims for damages, etc.), the Arbitrator found it “not necessary to determine if, and to
what extent, CISG is applicable, as opposed to Russian law proper, excluding CISG.” In situa-
tions where the contractual provisions did not provide clear-cut solutions, he “looked both at
Russian law and CISG and always [came] to the conclusion that application of Russian law
would lead to the same result as application of the CISG.” For this reason, the Arbitrator found
it not “necessary to determine the potential threshold issue mentioned above, interesting as it
may be from a scholarly point of view.” As author of the present article, I thank the Arbitrator
and the attorneys for the parties concerned for providing me with a copy of this Award and for
granting me permission to convey the foregoing (limited) information in an academic context.
Regarding “licensing” and “custom software” see also infra, notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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flected by the domestic sales laws of Contracting States.68 In many
(perhaps most) of these jurisdictions, “a sale of goods” is generally
understood as the transfer of a property right in a moveable thing.69
Computer programs should qualify as goods on both counts: property
rights in a (copy of) a program are readily transferred,70 just as (copies
of) that program can be “moved” (by disk or by Internet) from place
to place.
Though we cannot see or touch it, a computer program is not
really all that different from a tractor or a micro-wave oven, in that a
program—designed and built to process words, bill customers or play
games—is also a kind of “machine”. In other words, a computer pro-
gram is a real and very functional thing; it is neither “virtual reality”
nor simply a bundle of (copyrighted) “information.”71 Once we recog-
nize the functional nature of a program, we begin to see that the
CISG rules (on contract formation, obligations, remedies for breach
etc.) are well-suited to regulate international sales of these particular
“things.”72
68. Accord Herber in SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, Art. 7, Rd.Nr.
26(comparative law may help illuminate common meaning of term in Contracting States).
Compare the similar approach of the European Court of Justice whose “autonomous” interpre-
tation sometimes involves the search for a “common core” among the laws and jurisprudence of
the various Member States. See, e.g., the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Conven-
tion in Bier, Case 21/76 [1976] ECR 1735, discussed in LOOKOFSKY & HERTZ, supra note 29, ch.
2.2.
69. See Lookofsky, supra note 49, ch. 2.3.a (re. goods/løsøre under Danish domestic sales
law). The (original, as of this writing still applicable version of) American UCC § 2-105(1) de-
fines goods as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification to the contract . . .”
(my emphasis). In international sales a similar understanding of the “sale of goods” concept is
supported by CISG Articles 30-31. According to the revised (2002) version of UCC § 2-102(4) a
transaction in a product consisting of “computer information and goods that are solely the me-
dium containing the computer information” is not a “transaction in goods”; similarly, the
UCITA (not 76 infra) excludes such “information” (data, programs) from its definition of goods
(§ 102, subsecs. 33 and 35).
70. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
71. The word “virtual”—as in “virtual reality”—means “being in essence or effect but not
in fact”. To describe intangible goods as “virtual” goods wrongly implies that intangible goods
are somehow “not real”. In fact, an intangible computer program is every bit as “real” as a
typewriter, tractor or other tangible thing. Unfortunately, the misnomer “virtual good” seems to
be gaining currency: see, e.g., Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce—Electronic Contracting:
Provisions for a Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.95 (2001) (employing the term
“virtual goods”). It seems that those who prefer to “lump” computer software (programs) to-
gether with other kinds of electronic “information” (e.g. the raw data in a database) fail to see
the essential nature of a program as a “machine”—a highly functional thing with complex parts
(codes etc.) that make it “work”. Accord (as re. Danish law) KIM FROST,
INFORMATIONSYDELSEN (Copenhagen 2002) pp. 106 ff.
72. It should be emphasized in this connection that a CISG seller’s (implied-by-default)
obligation to deliver goods fit for “ordinary”—and sometimes also buyer’s particular— pur-
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Clearly, the fact that the software in question may be protected
by copyright does not change the nature of this invisible and intangi-
ble, yet highly functional beast.73 If the particular (intangible) pro-
gram-copy sold is “packaged” in/on a (tangible) floppy disk or CD,
then that hybrid thing is (all) goods. The fact that the program is pro-
tected by copyright means “only” that the buyer cannot legally make
copies of (his copy of) the program without the copyright-holder’s
permission; it does not change the fact that the subject matter of the
transaction—i.e. the individual program-copy purchased—is (CISG)
“goods”.74
So, assuming the parties have not otherwise (validly) agreed,75
the CISG should be applied to international sales of computer soft-
ware, including transactions which program-sellers often inappropri-
ately dub “licenses”:76 not only sales of software on disk, but also
poses (BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 4-7) does not mean that software buyers can
expect “perfect” (glitch-free) products. Re. (e.g.) Danish domestic law see MADS BRYDE
ANDERSEN & JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, LÆREBOG I OBLIGATIONSRET (Copenhagen 2000) at 69 f.
73. Accord (regarding American domestic/UCC sales law, at least as regards programs
“implanted” in a physical medium) Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir.
1991). In connection with a discussion of the nature of “embedded software” Lorin Brennan
concludes that “computer programs are not goods”, but this conclusion seems unsupported by
the arguments presented Mr. Brennan in the course of his discussion of “Embedded Software”—
Fact or Felony?, UCC BULLETIN, May 2001.
74. I.e., notwithstanding the fact that the copyright holder retains its intellectual property
rights in the program.
75. The right to contract out of the CISG, in whole or part, is of course extremely impor-
tant, for example, as regards the right of software sellers to (validly) limit their liability for soft-
ware not fit for ordinary or special purposes under Article 35. See supra notes 44-45 and accom-
panying text and infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. See also generally BERNSTEIN &
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, ch. 7 (regarding disclaimers and liability limitations and the right of
buyers to “minimum adequate remedies”). Re. software “licences” see infra note 76 and accom-
panying text.
76. Though the manufacturing lobby continues its crusade in favor of legislation which
would transform sales of goods into (reduced warranty) “licenses,” it is still (in most places) up
to the court or arbitral tribunal to determine whether the transaction in question qualifies as a
“sale” or something else, e.g. a lease or “license”. If B in State X orders, receives and pays for
(e.g.) a disk containing a word-processing program from S in State Y, that transaction should be
viewed as an (international) sale—not a “license”—of goods (accord as regards Danish domestic
law FROST, supra note 71, 125-126), and this is true even if S provides B with fine-print, shrink-
wrapped/click-wrapped standard terms which dub the transaction a “license”. Copyright protec-
tion is one thing, but the fact that B can only (legally) use the goods purchased in ways which
respect S’s intellectual property rights in the software does not somehow turn a sale into a li-
cense, and if S supplies a term which attempts to escape the reality of the situation, that term
ought not bind B. (The political nature of the issue is highlighted by “bombshelter” laws en-
acted in some American states which invalidate contract clauses purporting to opt in to the Uni-
form Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA): see 70 U.S.L.W. 2439 (2001) and 71
U.S.L.W. 2086 (2002). Regarding the incorporation, interpretation and validity of standard
terms, see generally BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY at id. In other words, both the disk and the pro-
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purely intangible software sold and delivered/downloaded over the
Internet.77  And though the logic set forth here is mainly relevant as
regards “standard” programs,78 also less-common transactions pro-
viding for the development and sale of specialized (tailor-made) pro-
grams should be held to fall within the Convention ambit.79
gram-copy on it should become B’s property, and B’s rights as a buyer (with respect to both)
should be governed by the CISG default rules. To this logic, I add the opinion by U.S. District
Judge Dean D. Pregerson in Softman Products Co., LLC v. Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F.Supp.
1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the transfer of bundled software to an end user was a sale
and not a licence),  which I was happy to stumble upon not long before I submitted the manu-
script for this article to Duke.
77. Accord PILTZ, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT, supra note 2, § 2 Rd.Nrn. 47-48; Her-
ber in SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, Art.1 Rd.Nr. 21 with n. 37a, with refer-
ence Diedrich, RIW 1993, 441; MAGNUS, supra note 15, Art. 1, Rd.Nr. 44, 46. Compare (re.
American domestic sales law) the decision by the U.S. District Court in Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp., 150 F.Supp. 2d 585 (D.C.N.Y.  2001)(“parties’ relationship essen-
tially . . . that of a seller and a purchaser of goods . . . Plaintiff requested Defendant’s product by
clicking on an icon marked “Download,” and Defendant then tendered the product”). Those
who maintain that the CISG only applies to software contained in a “tangible medium” seem to
be confusing the intangible good (the software) with the (tangible or intangible) medium which
“carries” and/or “contains” that good. If B buys a program on a disk, she has really bought two
“things”: a program and a disk. Both are goods and either can be sold separately. If S sells a
program to B and then “delivers” that program to B by making it downloadable over the Inter-
net, the cyberspace “delivery” might be seen as a service (like the delivery of a package by
post), but the software delivered remains a (real) good. The “commercial” (wirtschaftliche) ap-
proach taken by Piltz, id., Rd.Nr. 48, also accords with this view. But see Cox, T., Chaos v. uni-
formity: divergent views of software, 4 VINDOBONA J. OF INT. COMM. LAW & ARB. 3 (2000) and
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ cisg/biblio/cox.html text with note 17 (arguing that software is a good
because it is “incorporated” into a tangible good) and Ferrari in SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR,
supra note 13, Art. 1, Rd.Nr. 38 (corporeal/körperlichen medium “necessary”).
Article 2 of the European E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) defines—(only) for the
purpose of this Directive—”information society services” as services provided at a distance by
electronic means at the individual recipient’s request: see Article 1(2) of the Technical Stan-
dards Directive (98/34/EC, 998/48/EC); Annex V of the Technical Standards Directive specifi-
cally excludes “Off-line services: distribution of CD-roms or software on diskettes”. Neither the
said definition nor the exclusion justify the conclusion reached by Cox (id., Part III) that
“[c]ourts and commentators will logically be forced to conclude that a transaction for electronic
software is a service contract”. Obviously, the E-Commerce Directive is “more focused on pro-
tecting and providing information than establishing rules for contract law” (Cox at id.), and if a
given transaction—an on-line sale of software— qualifies as a CISG sale of goods, the defini-
tions and exclusions in the European E-Commerce Directive will not compel anyone (any-
where) to conclude otherwise.
78. A German court has held that a contract for the sale of (standard) software is governed
by the CISG: see the decision of LG München, 8 February 1995, no. 8 HKO 24667/93, CLOUT
Case 131, also available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950208g4.html.
79. But see Ferrari, Specific Topics, supra note 57, at 66 n.439 and accompanying text;
Frost, supra note 71, 140-142. Since truly “tailor-made” software deals are increasingly rare (see
ANDERSEN, M., IT RETTEN (Copenhagen 2001), section 21.5.b), this is probably the least im-
portant aspect of the software-as-goods controversy. In any case, the value of the (intangible)
creativity, technology, information and/or man-hours needed to produce any thing is irrelevant
9LOOKOFSKY.DOC 07/17/03  11:15 AM
Special Issue 2003] IN DUBIO PRO CONVENTIONE? 279
In dubio pro conventione? The international jury is still “out” on
the software  issue,80 but faced with facts like those in Illustration 5,
Herbert Bernstein and I shared the Understanding and conviction
that the Convention should apply.81
IV. THE PREËMPTION ISSUE UNDER
ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 7(2)
The Convention was not designed to deal with each and every
problem which might arise in connection with an international sale.
Even assuming that the transaction concerned qualifies as an interna-
tional sale of goods under Articles 1, 2 and 3, we still need to ask
whether the resolution of the particular issue is governed by the rules
in CISG Parts II and III. If we find a Convention rule which “covers”
the issue in question, we may then need to consider whether that rule
preëmpts the application of a potentially “competing” domestic law
rule.
According to Article 4, the Convention regulates issues (matters)
concerning sales contract formation (CISG Part II) as well as the
rights and obligations of the parties to the international sale (Part
when considering whether or not that “thing” is “goods”. The tailor-made software discussion
should not be confused with the separate question of “mixed” (sales and service) transactions:
in cases where the service element (say, a supplier’s post-delivery obligation to service and main-
tain computer hardware and/or software) predominates—i.e., where the value of maintenance is
greater than the value of the computer and/or software)—then Article 3(2) will serve to ensure
that the entire transaction is removed from the CISG scope. See supra note 66 and accompany-
ing text.
80. Regarding the decision by OLG Koblenz see supra note 57. Similar issues arise re-
garding the application of domestic sales laws, and though the controversial, indeed “political”
nature of the question has prompted considerable debate and a great divergence of views, most
of the best reasoned decisions seem to support the idea that computer programs should qualify
as goods. Accord (re. German domestic law) BGH of 4 November 1987 (BGHZ 102, 135), 18
October 1989 (BGHZ 109, 97). See also BGH, 14 July 1993, MDR 1993, 950 applying German
domestic sales law to a transaction involving the delivery and installation of standard computer
software. Also American (UCC) case law lends support to the position that (at least some) pro-
grams are “goods”: see, e.g., Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that sale of software was a UCC sale of goods); Softman Prods. Co., 171 F.Supp.
2d at 1085 (referring to the sale of software as a sale of goods); Specht, 150 F.Supp. 2d at 591
(treating the downloading of software as a sale of goods). But see (re. the English Sale of Goods
Act) St. Albans City & Distict Council v. International Computers Ltd., [1996] 4 All ER 481
(1996) (refusing to classify a computer program as SGA goods, while emphasizing the fact that
there was not transfer to a physical medium, such as a disk).
81. See BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 2-5. During one of our last sessions at
Duke in April 2001, see supra note 1, I asked my co-author whether he thought the “license is-
sue” should affect our position on software-as-goods. His reply was disbelief: “Licence? What
the hell is that supposed that mean?” I am therefore sure that Herbert would have been most
pleased by Judge Pregerson’s ruling in the Softman case, supra note 76.
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III). Conversely, the CISG is simply “not concerned” with issues re-
lating to sales contract validity; nor is it concerned with the effect
which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.82 Such
non-concern is, at least, the CISG general rule.83 Indeed, the CISG
drafters made no attempt whatsoever to prescribe the legal effect of a
mutual mistake as to the existence of the subject matter of the con-
tract,84 a seller’s negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation as to the
quality of the goods, a seller’s threat not to perform  unless a price-
increase is secured (i.e., economic duress), an allegedly unreasonable
disclaimer or limitation of liability, a “penalty” clause,85 etc.
Validity-issues arise, inter alia, when courts and arbitrators are
asked to “police” sales contracts (and other agreements) “against un-
fairness by placing limits on their enforceability.”86 Since the CISG is
generally not concerned with validity, most problems which fall under
this heading—like, e.g., fraud, duress, mistake or the reasonableness
of contract terms—must be resolved in accordance with domestic
rules of law.87
Illustration 6: S in Denmark sells goods to B in France on the basis
of S’s standard contract which purports to disclaim “all liability” in
the event the goods do not conform. Later, S  delivers defective
goods, and B seeks to recover compensation for the loss caused by
that breach.
82. The words “in particular” in CISG Article 4 indicate that validity and property are not
the only subjects not covered by the CISG: see WITZ, supra note 9, no. 24; Herber in
SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, Art. 4 Rd.Nr. 19-24; Ferrari in SCHLECHTRIEM,
KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, Art. 4, Rd.Nr. 12, 32-41.
83. As indicated by the so-called “except clause” in CISG Article 4, there are some excep-
tions: in other words, the Convention deals with some “validity” matters. One such matter—the
lack of formal requirements—is expressly dealt with in CISG Article 11.  Another such provi-
sion is Article 29 which provides that a CISG contract can be modified by mere “agreement”;
for this reason, a CISG party’s commitment to modify a contract—e.g., a seller’s promise to ac-
cept a price lower that the price originally agreed— is valid and binding even in the absence of
what Common lawyers call “consideration”.
84. See the decision of Handelsgericht St. Gallen (Switzerland), 24 August 1995, available
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950824s1.html (buyer who believed it signed
order of sample goods of much lower value held not liable to pay).
85. See the decision of Gerechtshof Arhem (Netherlands), 22 August 1995, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950822n1.html.
86. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.1 (1999).
87. The private international law (choice-of-law rules) of the forum court determines which
State’s domestic validity rules to apply. If a clause in the CISG sales contract is held to be inva-
lid by virtue of these domestic rules, the CISG (and not domestic sales law) should be used to
fill the gap; accord HEUZÉ, V., LA VENTE INTERNTIONALE DE MARCHANDISES (Paris 1990) no.
100.
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Some might find a disclaimer like this surprising and maybe even un-
reasonable—at least if measured by the Convention remedial yard-
stick88 —but since the validity of a disclaimer is a matter which lies
outside the CISG scope, the question of whether the buyer is actually
bound by that term must ordinarily be resolved by domestic rules.89
Although the parties have the freedom to formulate their obligations
and even their remedies in the event of breach (etc.),90 the validity of
the parties’ contract (and its individual terms) cannot be resolved
(solely) on the basis of the CISG.91 Since the applicable rules of pri-
vate international law in this situation would probably point to the
domestic law of S,92 the disclaimer will be held effective (and displace
CISG remedies ordinarily available to the buyer) if—and only if—it
satisfies the reasonableness-test set forth in the General Clause of the
Danish Contracts Act.93
In Illustration 6 the application of a domestic rule serves to fill
the “validity-gap” openly acknowledged by Article 4. A related,
though in some respects more elusive and controversial provision is
Article 7(2):94
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which
are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with
the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
88. The CISG (default) starting point is full compensation for breach. Regarding the
buyer’s CISG remedies see generally BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, ch. 6B.
89. An alternative possibility is that parties’ agreement can incorporate the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, including its validity rules, so as to supple-
ment the CISG on this point. It should also be noted that an onerous contract term which con-
travenes CISG “fundamental principles” (Grundwertungen) might be denied effect for that rea-
son alone, i.e., even if the term would be valid under the otherwise applicable law. See
BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 7-4 with note 67, citing Oberster Gerichtshof (Aus-
tria), 7 September 2000, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/
000907a3.html.
90. CISG Article 6. See supra text accompanying note 44.
91. The CISG remedial rules may be relevant in assessing the reasonableness of agreed
remedies, as the CISG gap-filling solution is recognized as a reasonable solution in the “aver-
age” case. See BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 7-4. See also supra note 89.
92. In this situation, both Danish and French courts would apply the 1955 Hague Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods to determine the law applicable to
the validity question. See http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/menu03e.html and BERNSTEIN &
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 1-4.
93. For a comparison between Danish domestic validity rules and the validity provisions of
the UNIDRIOT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, see Joseph Lookofsky, The
Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom , 46 AM. J. COMP. LAW 485 (1998).
94. Regarding the stormy and inconclusive “legislative history” of this rule see supra note
25.
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principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law.
The less controversial part of this provision (after the word “or”) tells
us to use PIL (choice-of-law) rules to find domestic rules capable of
plugging gaps in the Convention text (e.g., the validity-gap created by
Article 4).95 The first part of the rule in Article 7(2) is very different: it
tells courts and arbitrators to use general Convention principles to
plug certain gaps in the CISG text. Suppose, for example, that a CISG
buyer (B) claims that S has committed a fundamental breach. If B
sends S a declaration of avoidance, can B later change her mind and
revoke that declaration?96 The CISG provides no rule which deals di-
rectly with this particular question, but rather than resort to domestic
rules unrelated to the CISG regime, we might apply the first rule in
Article 7(2), regard the matter (the revocation issue) as governed by
the CISG,97 and then seek to “settle” that matter by means of CISG
general principles, including good faith and estoppel.98 If, for example,
S unjustifiably refuses to accept B’s (well-founded) avoidance decla-
ration, this might mean B’s subsequent revocation should be given ef-
fect.99
In other situations, the Convention will contain a remedial rule
which expressly “covers” a given issue, but we still need to consider
the possible application of concurrent, potentially “competing” reme-
dies under domestic law. Assume, for  example, that a CISG seller is
guilty of a negligent (or even fraudulent) misrepresentation as to the
95. Of course, “matters” not governed by the Convention can only be “settled” by resorting
to non-Convention rules and principles. Since the Convention is generally “not concerned” with
matters relating to the “validity” of the sales contract and/or obligations grounded in delict, such
matters are not “governed by” the Convention (and cannot be settled by the CISG or its general
principles). See BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, §§ 2-6, 2-11.
96. In other words, keep the goods, and pursue other CISG remedies, including damages,
instead. Because avoidance can have serious consequences for the party in breach, CISG Article
26 provides that a declaration of avoidance of the contract, e.g. under Article 49, is effective only
if made by notice to the other party; the contract is avoided as of the point in time when the no-
tice is given.
97. Since the narrow “matter” in question (whether a declaration of avoidance is binding
upon the declaring party) was left untouched by the CISG drafters, it might seem difficult to
regard it as “governed” thereby. On the other hand, it is clear that the larger question (matter)
of avoidance, including (e.g.) the subject of when declarations of avoidance take effect, is gov-
erned thereby.
98. See BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 2-10, text with notes 143-44.
99. Thus providing B with the option to keep the goods and pursue other remedies. See
generally Schlechtriem in SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY/KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, Art. 27,
Rd.Nr. 14. Compare the similar result reached by Huber, using somewhat different reasoning, in
SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY/KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, Art. 45, Rd.Nr. 28.
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quality of the goods and that—for that reason, under the otherwise
applicable domestic law—the buyer would be entitled to rescind (de-
clare invalid and terminate) the contract. If so, the domestic (rescis-
sion) remedy might be seen to overlap with CISG avoidance rules
which allow the buyer to avoid in the event of a fundamental
breach.100 Similarly, a seller’s delictual (tort) liability for the economic
consequences of such a negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation
might—at least in some situations—overlap with the Convention
damages regime.101 In these and similar situations, a question of Con-
vention interpretation arises: should the court or arbitral tribunal
hold that the whole matter is exclusively “governed by [the] Conven-
tion”,102 i.e., with the result that the applicable CISG remedy works to
preëmpt (displace, “trump”) any domestic remedy which might oth-
erwise apply?103 Or should such a domestic remedy be allowed to
compete (serve “side by side”) with the relevant CISG rule?
In some cases, courts and arbitrators will have good reason to
exercise restraint before they permit domestic rules to compete with
(and possibly disturb) the uniform remedial solution provided by the
CISG. Since, for example, the exemption “safety valve” in Article
79(1) provides a flexible tool for reaching fair solutions in cases of
force majeure and other alleged “impediments” to performance—in-
cluding situations which might (also) be subsumed under the some-
times redundant domestic headings of “impossibility” or “mistake”—
the argument for preëmption of domestic remedies in this situation
seems relatively strong.104 In other cases, it may be appropriate to
100. Under, for example, American domestic law, avoidance might be allowed for a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation without concern for its materiality, FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, §§ 4.10-
4.15, whereas under CISG Article 49(1)(a), a fundamental breach is the condicio sine qua non
for avoidance, Huber in SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 416; Huber in
SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, at 535.
101. For a discussion of this question see BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 4-6.
102. CISG Article 7(2).
103. See also the Detailed Analysis of Article 7(2) in ALBERT KRITZER, 2 GUIDE TO THE
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 77 (1994). While the (American) term “preëmption” may
have no direct counterpart in continental European legal terminology, the concept is obviously
familiar enough, as the discussion of Article 7(2) by French, German and other continental
authors shows. Lawyers trained in the Civil law tradition are more used to a code-style of inter-
pretation which is, arguably, what Article 7(2) calls for; accord AUDIT, VENTE
INTERNATIONALE, supra note 13, nos. 53a, 54.
104. See e.g. Article 1108 of the French Civil Code (requiring an objet certain) and § 306 of
the German Civil Code (dealing with “objective impossibility”). On the inapplicability of these
and similar validity rules in “impediment” situations see (e.g.) the decision of Corte di Appello
di Milano (Italy), 11 December 1998, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/
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distinguish between rules which complement and rules which compete.
For example, although Article 8 contains rules which govern certain
aspects of a larger problem— the interpretation of CISG contracts—
we ought not conclude that the CISG governs the entire matter. In
other words, Article 8 ought not displace (preëmpt) all other rules of
contract interpretation. Courts and arbitrators should, for example,
feel free to supplement Article 8 with the contra proferentem princi-
ple, as that (non-CISG) “common core” principle is generally under-
stood in both domestic and international commercial law.105
So far, only a few reported decisions deal (overtly) with the com-
petition/preëmption problem;106 to help illustrate its many facets, we
can consider a hypothetical or two:
Illustration 7: B in Vienna asks S in Rome for information regard-
ing the performance of a given machine. S, who is anxious to gener-
ate income for his fledgling business,  negligently provides informa-
tion which applies to a more costly model with a higher maximum
capacity. Acting in reliance on this information, B orders the ma-
chine. After delivery, B makes repeated, unsuccessful attempts to
run the machine at the stated capacity. Three weeks after the final
attempt, B gives notice of non-conformity to S.
The Convention requires that S deliver goods which match the con-
tract specifications. If S fails to perform the obligations set forth in
the contract (and/or other obligations implied in Article 35), the
buyer can claim the benefit of CISG remedies for breach.107 To this
extent, the CISG contractual regime supplants (replaces, preëmpts)
cases2/981211i3.html. See also Schlechtriem, P., INTERNATIONALES UN-KAUFRECHT (Tübin-
gen 1996), Rd.Nr. 36 and BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 6-19 with note 234.
Since the hardship rules set forth in Ch. 6(2) of the UNIDROIT Principles do not “re-
state” generally applicable principles of international law, see Lookofsky, supra note 93, at 500-
501, these rules should not be applied to supplement the CISG, even though, for example, a
Finnish court might refer to CISG Articles 4 and 7 and supplement the Convention with its do-
mestic “hardship” regime: see Tom Southerington, Impossibility of Performance and Other Ex-
cuses in International Trade, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ southering-
ton.html.
105. See supra notes 50 and 68 and accompanying text. Accord MICHAEL BONELL, AN
INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW 73-82 (2d ed. 1997) (regarding the co-
existence of the CISG and Unidroit Principles). Re. the applicability of domestic rules regarding
letters of confirmation  and the conclusion of CISG contracts by silence, see Morten Fogt,
Gerichtsstand den Erfüllungsortes, IPRAX 2001, 358-364 (with reference to the decision of the
Danish Supreme Court, 15 February 2001, reported  in UfR 2001.1039 H).
106. See, e.g.,the decision of Corte di Appello di Milano, supra note 104. See also LG
Aachen (Germany), 14 May 1993, RIW 1993, 760-761, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cisg/wais/db/cases2/930514g1.html (application of CISG precluded recourse to domestic law re-
garding mistake as to the quality of the goods); compare the buyer’s mistake in the case decided
by Handelsgericht St. Gallen, supra note 84.
107. See BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, ch. 6.
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corresponding domestic sales law remedies. But it does not necessar-
ily follow that courts and arbitrators cannot allow a party access to
other, non-contractual remedial rules. Under the domestic law of
some countries (including some CISG Contracting States), a given set
of facts can sometimes give rise to both a contractually based claim
and to a tort-based, delictual liability claim as well.108 Given this pos-
sibility of competition between rule-sets in purely domestic situations,
some CISG buyers might seek to supplement a Convention-based
claim with a non-contractual claim pursuant to the otherwise applica-
ble domestic law of delict.109 In Illustration 7, since B may not have
notified S of the non-conformity within a “reasonable time,” B may
have lost the right to claim any CISG remedy,110 and those commenta-
tors who maintain that the Convention remedial rules “occupy” the
entire non-conformity field would deny B access to alternative do-
mestic law remedies (e.g.) for negligent misrepresentation.111 Other
108. In some of these systems, the contractual and delictual bases of liability are seen as
“competing” with each other, at least in certain situations, so that (e.g.) a seller who makes a
negligent or fraudulent “misrepresentation” concerning the quality of his goods might con-
ceivably be sued in both contract and tort. Regarding English law see TREITEL, LAW OF
CONTRACT, Ch. 9, Sec. 3; re. German law see Peter Schlechtriem, The Borderland of Tort and
Contract - Opening a New Frontier?, 21 CORNELL INT. L. J. 469, 470 (1988). Regarding  Scandi-
navian law see JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
(Copenhagen 1989) at 156-159 and ANDERSEN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 72, sec. 5.1.e, 5.5.e.
In other systems, the doctrine of non-cumul may prevent a buyer bound by contract, such as a
sales contract, from bring a tort action against the seller for acts involving that relationship. Re-
garding French law see MAZEAUD & CHABAS, LÉÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS,
THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE (8th ed. 1991) at p. 384-385 (no. 404). In most American jurisdictions, a
similar view prevails as regards tort-based product liablity claims seeking compensation for
“pure economic loss”.
109. See generally Lookofsky, supra note 38. See also John Erauw, and Harry Flechtner,
Remedies under the CISG and Limits to their Uniform Character, in, INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS REVISITED 65 (Petar Šarevi & Paul Volken eds., 2001) (stating that overlap between
claims and remedies in tort and in contract are “unavoidable”).
110. Regarding the strict application of Article 39(1), especially by German courts, see
BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 4-9.
111. See MAGNUS, supra note 15, Art. 45, Rd.Nr. 43; Huber in SCHLECHTRIEM,
KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, Art. 45, Rd.Nr. 54; Schlechtriem, supra note 108, at 469, 473;
Schlechtriem, supra note 105, Rd.Nr. 42; PILTZ, supra note 2, § 2 Rd.Nrn. 127-129; Heuzé, supra
note 87, no. 282 with note 76. These same authorities would also disallow rescission of the con-
tract on the theory that the CISG rules on non-conformity occupy the field to the exclusion of
non-contractual liability rules. Compare AUDIT, VENTE INTERNATIONALE, supra note 13, no.
121 (somewhat undecided). See also the decision of LG Aachen (Germany), supra note 106, and
the commentary by Witz, supra note 9, nos. 21, 87. The same commentators might, however,
allow negligent misstatements relating to something other than non-conformity to trigger non-
contractual claims under domestic law. For example, incorrect information about the chance to
resell the goods at a profit, or a seller’s statement concerning his production capability, or a
buyer’s financial statement would fall within this category. Regarding culpa in contrahendo, see
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commentators, arguing that remedies for misrepresentation lie out-
side the CISG scope, would  allow B alternate access to such a com-
peting domestic law claim.112
Although we need to “have regard” to the need to “promote uni-
formity” in Convention application, the CISG hardly requires deci-
sion-makers to preëmpt (trump) domestic rules designed to provide
remedies for unfair or culpable conduct; indeed, the CISG was not
designed to deal with issues like these.113 Contractual and delictual
remedies have—for good reasons— coexisted in many jurisdictions
for centuries,114 and a given State’s ratification of the sales Convention
does not imply its intention to “merge” contract with tort. There is
“no difficulty in regarding the imposition of a duty of care in tort as
independent of any contractual liability,”115 and the CISG was de-
signed only to deal with the contractual side.116
A related competition-question arises when goods purchased in
an international sale cause physical damage to the buyer’s property:
Illustration 8: Dentist (B) in Copenhagen purchases a combined
chair-and-drill unit from a supplier (S) in Frankfurt. Soon after de-
livery, defective wiring in the unit causes a fire which destroys the
unit and does damage to B’s office. B brings an action in Germany
against S—not only to recover the purchase price of the unit itself,
but also for consequential loss (damage to the office, loss of profit
etc.).
Since this is a “sale of goods” under Article 1(1)(a), and since the
goods (the unit) delivered by the seller do not conform under Article
35,117 the dentist clearly has a viable CISG (contractual) cause of ac-
tion for damages, likely to include compensation for the (foreseeable)
Schechtriem, supra note 108, at 474-75 and Schlechtriem, supra note 2, Rd.Nr. 81.
112. See Lookofsky, supra note 108, at 276 ff; Lookofsky, supra note 38, at 409; Lookofsky,
supra note 46, ¶ 63. See also JAN RAMBERG, KÖPLAGEN (Stockholm 1995) at 112 f. (arguing
that sales contracts, like other contracts, are subject to general contract principles, and that do-
mestic principles, such as culpa in contrahendo, can therefore supplement the CISG); but com-
pare RAMBERG, J. & HERRE, J., INTERNATIONELLA KÖPLAGEN (Stockholm 2001) at 64 f.
(adopting Honnold’s position on misrepresentations).
113. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text and infra note 127 and accompanying
text.
114. See, e.g., Andrew BURROWS, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (Oxford
1998) at 24 ff. (explaining concurrent liability under English law).
115. Id. at 28 (emphasis added here). On this point Professor Burrows’ logic (emphasizing,
as regards misrepresentation, the presence or absence of reasonable reliance) seems more fo-
cused and compelling than that of Professor Honnold, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 25, § 65 (ar-
guing on the basis of “operative facts”).
116. See CISG Article 4.
117. See BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 4-7.
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losses in question.118 According to Article 5, the Convention does not
apply to questions regarding the liability of the seller for death or per-
sonal injury caused by the goods; but this provision does not exclude
all “product liability” issues from the Convention’s scope. On the
contrary, by clear implication (argumentum e contrario), Article 5
permits a CISG buyer like B to make a claim for compensation under
the Convention regime in cases where non-conforming CISG goods
cause damage to the buyer’s property.119
Suppose, however, that B has reason to assert an alternative, de-
lictual claim (e.g., because his notice of seller’s breach might be held
untimely under Article 39).120  Since the German court, under its
choice-of-law rule, would consider both Danish and German tort law
to be applicable,121 an action based on Danish or German product li-
ability rules could—and should—be allowed, along with any CISG
claim B might still have;122 in such event a plaintiff seeking damages
should be allowed to recover if he succeeds in proving the facts
needed to support either claim.123
118. See CISG Article 74, discussed in BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, id., § 6-15.
119. Accord: decision of Handelsgericht Zürich, 26 April 1995, available at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950426s1.html. Nor would Article 5 necessarily preclude an Article
74 indemnification claim by the buyer against the seller for sums payable to a third party (the
buyer’s buyer) who suffers personal injury as a result of defective goods: see OLG Düsseldorf, 2
July 1993, RIW 1993, 845, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/ cases2/930702g1.html, and
(approving the decision) Ferrari in SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, Art. 5,
Rd.Nr. 6-8, and MAGNUS, supra note 15, Art. 5, Rd.Nr.7; but see Schlechtriem in 1993 EWiR,
Art. 1 CISG 1/93 p. 1075, WITZ, supra note 9, no. 23. Absent a special agreement, a third party
cannot assert a CISG contract claim against the (first) seller for losses due to a product defect, as
might be possible in certain situations under Austrian or German domestic sales law; see
MAGNUS, id. Rd.Nr. 14, and Stoll in SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, Art. 74,
Rd.Nr.26.
120. Regarding the tough, pro-seller stance taken by German courts on the notice issue, see
BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, § 4-9.
121. In tort cases, German courts allow the plaintiff to recover either under the law of the
place where the relevant act occurred (here: presumably Germany), or under the law of the
place of injury (here: Copenhagen).
122. This seems to be the prevailing view; see Ferrari in SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR, su-
pra note 13, Art. 5, Rd.Nr. 5; MAGNUS, supra note 15,  Rd.Nr. 14 and authors cited in Rd.Nr. 13;
Schlechtriem, supra note 108, at 473 f. But there is very strong opposition. See HONNOLD, supra
note 25, § 73; HEUZÉ, supra note 87,  no. 94; Audit, supra note 13, no. 40. One reason for this
conclusion is that a tort action against the manufacturer is always available when the manufac-
turer did not sell the product directly to (and has no contract with) the injured party; the same
result should prevail when the manufacturer also happens to be the seller. Contra Honnold, su-
pra note 25, § 73; Huber, Internationales Deliktsrecht und Einheitskaufrecht, IPRax 1996, 91, 94
(discussing a ULIS case: BGH, 28 November 1994, IPRax 1996, 124).
123. The situation is obviously different in an international context if the CISG (contract)
rules are interpreted as precluding a plaintiff (like the dentist in Illustration 8) from asserting an
alternative tort claim under domestic law. See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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The possibility that some domestic rules might be allowed to
compete with (also applicable) CISG rules represents little threat to
the goal of achieving a uniform Convention interpretation,124 and the
application of domestic rules should not be preëmpted simply be-
cause the operative facts of a given case seem “covered” by a given
CISG rule. In a State where, under the pre-CISG scenario, (domestic)
sales, tort and validity rules worked to supplement one another,125 that
State’s accession to the Convention provides a clear indication of that
State’s willingness to substitute its domestic sales law with the CISG
rules; it does not indicate that State’s intention to place its contract,
tort and validity regimes “under one [CISG] roof.” Courts and arbi-
trators should therefore think twice before interpreting the Conven-
tion so expansively as to preëmpt domestic rules designed to provide
parties to sales (and other) contracts with alternative bases of reme-
dial relief.126 Indeed, the Convention drafters themselves rejected a
proposal to (expressly) limit Contracting States’ recourse to compet-
ing rules of domestic law.127
124. If the courts in State A and State B, when faced with similar sets of facts, would both
interpret the applicable Convention remedies as non-exclusive, that represents a uniform inter-
pretation of the relevant CISG remedial rules which allows the concurrence of domestic remedies
and which is not rendered “less uniform” by the possibility that the private international laws in
these States differ, thus leading to the supplementary application of different domestic law rules.
125. See text supra with note 108.
126. But see Huber in SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 370 and Huber in
SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, at 476 (rejecting rule-concurrence in the absence
of three “preconditions”). As regards mistake (compare supra notes 84 and 106) some commen-
tators have argued that CISG avoidance rules displace (some) domestic rules permitting a mis-
taken buyer to rescind: for a comparison of the widely diverging views on this point see Helen
Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT. L. 72-78 (1993); compare e.g., Peter Schlecht-
riem, Uniform Sales Law—The Experience with Uniform Sales Laws in the Federal Republic of
Germany, JURIDISK TIDSSKRIFT VID STOCKHOLMS UNIVERSITET 11-12 (1992).
127. The ULIS Convention of 1964, which preceded the CISG (see supra note 21), expressly
excluded the buyer’s right of recourse to domestic law in the case of non-conforming goods
(ULIS Article 34), except in cases of fraud (ULIS Article 89), whereas the Vienna drafters—
hoping it would be possible to create a separate, internationally uniform set of validity rules—in-
tentionally refrained from including a similar provision in the CISG: see Huber in
SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, Art. 45, Rd.Nr. 46-48 with n.86; Huber in
SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMMENTAR, supra note 13, Art. 45, Rd.Nr. 46-48 with n.106. The subsequent
failure of the international legislator to create and implement such a set of validity rules hardly
provides courts interpreting the CISG with “implied authority” to censor potentially concurring
domestic rules of law.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The 1980 Vienna Convention deserves our support, because it
represents a basically sound contractual regime, fair to the interests of
both buyers and sellers, and because this particular piece of transna-
tional legislation represents a great step forward when compared to
the provincialism of yesteryear.128 For this reason, Herbert Bernstein
and I would applaud the decisions which require clear and convincing
evidence of the parties’ intent to opt out of the CISG regime. By the
same token, we saw no good reason to narrow the (international)
“sale of goods” concept, so as to exclude transactions for the supply
of computer programs.
On the other hand, Convention supporters need not—and should
not—go  “overboard” when interpreting the rules which delimit the
CISG scope. Faced with difficult choices between preëmption (of) or
competition with domestic rules of law, Herbert and I shared a cau-
tious approach. The CISG is, to be sure, an elastic document, but it
ought not be stretched beyond its essential design.
128. See Lookofsky, supra note 38, at 416.
